

EPR-Organizations Update:

Coding Instructions

The present document serves as a guideline for the update and extension of the EPR-Organizations project under the supervision of Frederik Gremler and Nils B. Weidmann at the University of Konstanz starting in 2020. It is based on the original EPR-Organizations codebook developed by Vogt & Gleditsch (2016).

Introduction

The *EPR-Organizations* Dataset is a database on ethnically based political organizations for a globally representative sample of 40 countries. Based on the *Ethnic Power Relations* (EPR) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Vogt et al. 2015), it identifies political organizations that represent the interests of specific ethnic groups listed in EPR in these countries at the national level. These include political parties and interest organizations operating within the national political system (e.g., organizations of civil society movements), as well as ethnic self-determination movements engaged in non-conventional and/or violent political activities.

The dataset includes five general types of variables for each ethnic organization:

- the ethnic groups represented;
- the type of the organization-group link (i.e., the way ethnicity is invoked by the organization);
- foundation and, if applicable, dissolution year;
- organization agenda/goals;
- and mobilization strategies.

The current document presents the structure and the precise contents of the data collection process in more detail. It first outlines the different phases of the data collection. The second section provides a broad, encompassing definition of ethnic organizations before discussing the most critical operational criteria to identify relevant organizations. The concrete coding procedure is explained in detail in the third section, followed by short

definitions and descriptions of all variables coded for each ethnic organization included in the database in the fourth section. The final section explains the procedure for the time-variant codings of a subset of these variables.

1. Scope

The original EPR-Organizations dataset includes 40 countries covering the years from 1946 to 2013. We extend this data in two ways:

1. Expand the time coverage for previously coded countries for the years 2014-2019
2. Add new countries with a temporal coverage of the years from 2000 - 2019

We proceed as follows:

1. *Identifying relevant organizations*: List all relevant organizations of a given country that could conceivably be linked to an ethnic group. The universe of cases in this phase of data collection consists of political parties, self-determination organizations, and other non-state actors (e.g., NGOs, rebel organizations, etc.). These organizations are retrieved from a fixed set of sources outlined below.
2. *Linking ethnic organizations*: We then link these organizations to ethnic groups according to operational criteria outlined below– on a many-to-many basis, i.e. one organization can be linked to several ethnic groups and vice versa.
3. *Coding ethnic organizations*: For all linked organizations all substantial variables are coded. This stage of the process also introduces time-variance allowing us to track time periods when fundamental characteristics of organizations change.

Before turning to the concrete coding instructions, the next section outlines the definitions of the key terms and the operational criteria deduced from them.

2. Definitions and Inclusion Criteria

2.1. Ethnicity and Ethnic Organizations

Building on the EPR dataset (Vogt et al. 2015), the *EPR-Organizations* Data Project defines **ethnicity** as “any subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on the belief in

common ancestry and shared culture”, indicated through markers such as “common language, similar phenotypical features, adherence to the same faith, and so on” (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 98-9). Hence, this definition includes ethnolinguistic, ethnosomal (or “racial”), and ethnoreligious groups, but *not* tribes and clans (as, for example, the different clans in Somalia) that conceive of ancestry in genealogical terms, nor regions that do not define commonality on the basis of shared ancestry.

According to the diverse purposes of political organizations, they may invoke ethnicity through very different mechanisms. For example, the ethnic identity of a political party will usually manifest itself through its electoral support, that is, the ethnic identity of its voters, whereas an ethnic mass movement may make explicit ethno-political claims vis-à-vis the state government. Moreover, the way in which ethnicity is played out in politics also depends on the specific local contexts. For instance, organizations making explicit ethnic claims are constitutionally banned almost everywhere in Africa (Moroff 2010), whereas this is not the case in Latin America and (Eastern) Europe. Thus, in order to be globally applicable, any definition of ethnic organizations needs to be broad and encompassing enough to detect such organizations in distinct contexts, by incorporating different signals of the ethnic base of political organizations.

The *EPR-Organizations* Data Project defines an **ethnic organization** as:

An organization that represents the interests of one or more (but not other) ethnic group(s) in the country, in one of the following ways: a) through explicit ethnic claims; b) through recruitment along ethnic lines; or c) electoral support along ethnic group lines.

For the purposes of the coding process, this definition implies that:

- 1) A given ethnic organization in the dataset can be linked to more than one ethnic group. The crucial condition, however, is exclusivity. This implies that interest representation is specific to some groups, *but not others*, in the country. This means that a political organization that explicitly claims to represent all ethnic groups in a country is not considered an ethnic organization despite the ethnic reference.
- 2) There are three possible links between an ethnic organization and the group it represents:¹

¹ Note that the first two criteria parallel the approach taken by Wucherpfennig et al. (2012) for the identification of ethnic rebel organizations.

- a. **Ethnic claims:** public claims are made by the organization on behalf of (a) specific ethnic group(s). An ethnic claim is defined here as *consistent public demands in favor of the rights, benefits, or well-being of (a) specific ethnic group(s)*. This may include claims for self-determination, more influence for the group(s) over government, autonomy, language and other cultural rights, etc. (cf. Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 101). A classic example is the *Parti Québécois* (PQ) in Canada that makes explicit claims for the independence of French-speaking Québec and the promotion of the French language in English-dominated Canada.

Note that an *ethnic denominator* in the name of an organization is considered to be proof of a public ethnic claim.

- b. **Membership recruitment:** the organization recruits its members based on their ethnic identity, i.e., members overwhelmingly join, or are admitted to, the organization *because* they are from (a) specific ethnic group(s).

Note that an *ethnic denominator* in the name of an organization is considered to be proof of a strategy of ethnically based recruitment on the part of the organization, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.

- c. **Electoral support:** the electoral support (defined here as votes) of an organization – in this case, of the party – is ethnically based, i.e., voters overwhelmingly choose this party over other parties *because* they are from (a) specific ethnic group(s).²

Note that following Horowitz (1985, 296-301), we focus on the distribution of **organization support/recruitment**, rather than group support/recruitment. This means that the relevant criterion to determine both b) and c) is the degree to which a given organization is composed of/supported by (a) specific ethnic group(s).

Moreover, the term “because” is included in both b) and c) to ensure that organization support/recruitment is not accidental (for example, a mere function of demographic con-

² We do *not* consider an ethnic denominator in the name of an organization to be proof of ethnic electoral support because unlike claim-making and recruitment, the choices of voters are not under control of the organization itself. In other words, the ethnic denominator in the organization name is only seen as indicative of actions that stem from, or are controlled by, the organization itself.

ditions), but based on a conscious decision on the part of the individuals supporting/joining the organization. This means that ethnicity has to be the driving force for individuals to join, or vote for, a given organization. For example, the fact that the electoral support of the Liberal Party (*Partido Liberal*) in Colombia stems mostly from whites or *mestizos* (as opposed to Afrocolombians and indigenous people) does not mean that it is ethnically based, as this is mainly a mere function of demographics (the majority of Colombians are whites or *mestizos*). Most Liberal Party voters base their decisions on non-ethnic considerations, for example the historical antagonism to the Conservative Party (*Partido Conservador*).

Similarly, the fact that most members of the April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt happened to be Muslims does not make it an ethnic organization, as most of these members simply joined the organization to overthrow President Mubarak (a fellow Muslim) and put an end to authoritarian rule. In contrast, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood does meet the definition of an ethnic organization as its leaders and members follow a clear religious political agenda that excludes the country's Christian minority.

We do not attempt to distinguish between organizations promoting an individual or multiple ethnic groups. Some researchers such as Horowitz distinguish between ethnic and multi-ethnic organizations, which are also characterized by an explicit ethno-political mission but include "the major groups in conflict" (Horowitz 1985, 299). Since this would be hard to operationalize in a consistent way, we leave it up to the individual researchers to define criteria for distinguishing between mono-ethnic and multi-ethnic organizations. Having defined these key terms, the following sub-sections discuss in more detail which organizations are considered relevant for inclusion in the *EPR-Organizations* database.

2.2. Inclusion Criteria for Parties and Self-Determination Organizations

Initially, coders will screen a predefined set of relevant political organizations that could be classified as ethnic. The *EPR-Organizations* Data Project takes into account ethnic organizations that aim at leaving a given polity/state (i.e., organizations pursuing goals of autonomy or secession), as well as ethnic organizations that attempt to advance group interests within the polity.

Consequently, the universe of relevant organizations is composed of the following two components:

- all political parties participating in national-level elections (however free and fair they were) between 1946 and 2013 obtaining at least 1% of the national vote or winning one or more seats; and
- all self-determination organizations.

Note that in cases of coalitions of political parties, the “component” parties of the coalition are coded as separate political parties if they meet either of the following two criteria: i) they have participated as a self-standing party in at least one national (parliamentary or presidential) election, obtaining at least 1% of the national vote or won any number of seats in the parliament (even if this occurred through reserved seats); or ii) they have participated in national elections in different coalitions over time. If neither of these two criteria is met, only the coalition itself is included in the universe of relevant organizations (given that it obtained at least 1% of the national vote or won any number of seats in the parliament in at least one election).

2.3. Inclusion Criteria for Other Non-State Actors

To identify additional ethnic organizations, we rely on the following two sources:

1. Minority Rights Group International – World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples
2. Political Handbooks of the World (including the following years: 1984, 1989, 1991, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2013, 2015, 2018-2019)

The use of these sources requires some operational criteria that complement the definition of ethnic organizations given above. **First**, we focus on **formal organizations** defined as named non-state entities that recruit members and make political claims. A non-state entity is defined as any political entity that is not an internationally recognized state (or an administrative unit of such a state) and does not claim to be a state.³

Second, as mentioned above, the *EPR-Organizations* Data Project only includes ethnic organizations that represent group interests at the **national level of politics**. This criterion refers to the target of mobilization, rather than the structural set-up of the organization.

³ The only exception to this rule is the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” in Azerbaijan. Because we did not find any individual organization forming part of this self-proclaimed, but unrecognized state in our pre-defined universe of organizations, the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” was included in the dataset as a “placeholder” organization.

Hence, it does not imply that a given ethnic organization needs to have a national institutional reach (e.g., having branches in all regions of the country) to be included in the dataset. An organization may also be locally based as long as it makes political demands vis-à-vis the national state or has a direct influence on national-level politics. For example, a locally rooted indigenous organization in Guatemala that mobilizes against mining – a topic of great national importance – and makes explicit demands for the protection of their group’s ancestral territory vis-à-vis the Guatemalan national government would be included in the dataset.⁴ Also, while the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in Mexico is largely confined to the state of Chiapas, it challenged the national government and is thus counted as an ethnic organization. In contrast, local/regional organizations targeting local/regional government entities over local/regional concerns are not to be included.


Third, with regard to the **distinction between two or more (formally or informally) associated organizations**, such as Batasuna and ETA in the Basque country of Spain, our coding criterion relies on the leadership structure. Two organizations are considered to be separate organizations if they have a distinct leadership (in the sense that the organizations are headed by different people).⁵

Fourth, we do *not* include **regional divisions** (or branches) **of national organizations**, even if they are connected to specific regions (inhabited by specific ethnic groups) of a country. We distinguish between cases where organizations are founded as regional branches of national organizations and cases where independently formed regional organizations cooperate with other organizations at the national level. An example of the first scenario is the Socialist Party of the Basque Country that was founded and acts as the regional affiliate of the national Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). This case would *not* be considered a separate (ethnic) organization in the *EPR-Organizations* dataset. In contrast, the formation of the national indigenous organization CONAIE in Ecuador is a typical example of the second scenario. In this case, two regionally based indigenous organizations – ECUARUNARI and CONFENIAE, established in 1972 and 1980, respectively, and both politically active at the national level – formed the umbrella organization

⁴ Note also that these demands are not general environmentalist concerns but refer to the protection of the ancestral territory of a particular ethnic group.

⁵ With regard to coalitions of political parties, in particular, see the explanations in the preceding section.

Figure 1: Flowchart of the Coding Procedure



CONAIE in 1986. Since both regional organizations continue to exist under their own leaderships, advancing their own ethno-political demands, all three entities should be included in the dataset as separate ethnic organizations.

Fifth, extra-systemic ethnic organizations – that is, ethnic organizations **whose organizational bases lie outside the territory of the country** of the ethnic group they represent – are only included if i) they are country-specific, that is, if they were founded to represent the interests of (a) specific ethnic group(s) in that particular country only; ii) their peaceful or violent political actions take place at least partly within the territory of that country; *and* iii) their operations affect the national-level politics of the country. We do not include transnational organizations representing ethnic minority rights more broadly (such as local chapters of Human Rights Watch or supra-national indigenous organizations in Latin America, etc.) because they are not necessarily an expression of ethnic mobilization in that country.

The next sections explain the concrete coding procedure in more detail.

Figure 2: Listing the relevant political organizations. The "Organization" part of the CFE

The screenshot shows the GROWUP web interface. At the top, there are logos for ETH Zurich, Uppsala University, University of Essex, PRIO, and COST. Below the logos, the text reads "Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences | International Conflict Research" and "GROWUP - Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform". There are navigation buttons for "View", "Read", "Download", "Code", and "About".

The main content area is titled "Org 2019-2468: Codings for Peru assigned to Frederik Gremler planned". It contains a table with the following data:

COUNTRY	ORGANIZATION	SOURCES
Peru	Asociación Negra de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (ASONEDH)	MRGI
Peru	Asociación para la Conservación del Patrimonio del Cutivireni (ACPC)	MRGI
Peru	Avancemos	Nohlen's Handbook
Peru	Cambio 90 (Change 90) (C 90)	Nohlen's Handbook
Peru	Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría (Change 90/ New Majority) (C 90/NM)	Nohlen's Handbook
Peru	Cambio Radical (Radical Change)	Lupu, N. (2012). The 201
Peru	Centro de Desarrollo de la Mujer Negra Peruana (CEDEMUNEP)	MRGI
Peru	Centro de Investigación y Promoción Amazónica (CIPA)	MRGI
Peru	Centro de la Mujer Peruana Flora Tristán	MRGI
Peru	Comisión Andina de Juristas (CAJ) / Andean Commission of Jurists	MRGI
Peru	Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP)	Cunningham & MRGI
Peru	Convergencia Democrática (Democratic Agreement) (CODE)	Nohlen's Handbook

Below the table, there are buttons for "Start", "View Changes", "Add", "Edit", "Remove", "Export to Shapefile", "Export to Excel", and "Import Excel file". There is also a text input field for "Enter your comment here".

3. Coding Procedure

Organization-group linkages follow a many-to-many principle: each organization can be linked to more than one ethnic group, while an ethnic group can be represented by two or more different organizations. **Coders will work with an online coding instrument: the Coding Front End (CFE)** that is composed of **two parts**: the "Org 2019" part (listing relevant organizations) and the "Org2EPR 2019" part (linking organizations to ethnic groups and coding variables).

3.1. Adding New Countries

The coding proceeds as follows (s. a. Figure 1):

- I) Coders get registered in the CFE: <http://growup.ethz.ch/cfe/>
- II) Having notified the project manager (Frederik Gremler) of their registration, coders are assigned one or more countries. These countries are listed as "Tasks" on the left hand side of the website.
- III) Coders first work in the "Org2019" part of the CFE (see Figure 2). Click on a specific country (their task) and start the coding by pressing the "Start" button.


IV) In the “Org2019”-Project, they enter all political parties that have participated **in at least one national-level** (parliamentary or presidential) **election** in the country **between 2000** (or the year of the country’s independence) **and 2019, obtaining at least 1% of the national vote or winning any number of seats in the parliament (even if this occurred through reserved seats).**

Parties listed in the **following sources** should be included:

- Nohlen’s Election Handbooks
 - o Available online here: <https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?q=elections+data+handbook&search-Btn=Search&isQuickSearch=true>
 - o Currently not available for after 2013
- Parline Database
 - o <https://data.ipu.org/>
- Psephos: Adam Carr’s Election Archive
 - o <http://psephos.adam-carr.net/>
- European Election Database
 - o <https://nsd.no/european-election-database/>
 - o Currently not available for after 2011
- African Election Database
 - o <http://africanelections.tripod.com/>
 - o Currently not available for after 2012
- National Election Commission Data of the country

Coders should always rely on the most complete source available and/or combine different sources to arrive at the most complete list possible.

Figure 3: Classifying ethnic organizations and coding variables. The "Org2EPR2019" part of the CFE



V) Enter all organizations from Kathleen Cunningham’s dataset on self-determination organizations.⁶ Those organizations that do not fulfill our own coding criteria (e.g., trans-national organizations) should be flagged by specifying “Cunningham DNI” in the “Source” field of the “Org2019” part.⁷

- Kathleen Cunningham’s List of Self-Determination Groups

VI) Enter all additional non-state organizations for the relevant time-period from the following sources:

- Political Handbooks of the World (2015, 2018-2019)
 - o <http://sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/political-handbook-of-the-world-2015>
 - o <http://sk.sagepub.com/cqpress/political-handbook-of-the-world-2018-2019>
- Minority Rights International: World Directory of Minority Groups International
 - o <https://minorityrights.org/directory/>

⁶ Note that organizations from Cunningham’s dataset were not included if they could not be shown to actually have existed, or b) if the represented ethnic group is not listed in the EPR dataset.

⁷ This does *not* apply to the vote threshold. If a self-determination organization from Cunningham happens to have been active as a political party, too, we do not apply our vote share threshold.

Note that tasks IV) and V) are best carried out outside of the CFE, in an Excel sheet. You can use the “Export to Excel” and “Import Excel file” functions for this purpose (see the corresponding buttons at the bottom of the organization list in the CFE).

VII) Once all relevant organizations from the above sources have been listed, coders should press the “Complete” button and notify the project manager (Frederik Gremler) via e-mail.

VIII) After the project manager has integrated the list of organizations into the underlying database, coders can start working in the “Org2EPR 2019” part of the CFE.

IX) In the “Org2EPR2019” project of the CFE, coders identify ethnically based organizations among all listed organizations by coding each of the three “ethnic link variables” – ethnic claim, ethnic recruitment, and ethnic electoral support –, according to the definitions given above, and linking the organizations to the corresponding EPR groups in the “Org2EPR 2019” part of the CFE (see Figure 3 **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.**). (Hence, organizations that are not considered ethnic will be ignored in the “Org2EPR 2019” part.) This generates one or more organization-group links, depending on the number of ethnic groups matched with a given organization.

Coders classify parties based on their country expertise, primary, and secondary sources. When doing so, they should see themselves as judges evaluating the evidence from the “witnesses” (i.e., the sources) they consulted. They should always start with the assumption of “innocence” and only code an organization as ethnic when there is convincing evidence for it.

X) Finally, all other variables are coded for each organization-group link. This means that a given variable should be coded as true based on **characteristics that apply at any point in an organization’s lifetime**. For example, the “violence against government” variable is coded as 1 (true) if the organization in question has engaged in organized violence against the government at any point of its history. Temporal variation in certain variables is specified in the corresponding columns.

Note that both the classification of organizations and the coding of variables are best carried out within the system of the CFE.

XI) When coders have finished the “Org2EPR” part of the coding, they should press the “Complete” button and notify the project manager again who can then integrate the coding into the database.

3.2. Updating Existing Countries

While the general guidelines outlined above also apply when extending the coverage of previously coded countries to the years 2014-2019, the technical setup and coding procedure slightly changes:

- I) Coders exclusively work in the “Org2EPR2019”-project of the CFE, only adding new organizations that have emerged in the years from 2014 to 2019.⁸ The list of self-determination groups by Cunningham is time-invariant and hence does not have to be checked.
- II) For these new organizations, the coding process for substantial coding remains the same (s. Section 3.1.).
- III) For all other *previously coded organizations* all variables are updated. This entails checking whether an organization, after the year 2013, has ceased to exist, has added new strategies and goals as well as extending the coding of time variation beyond 2013. If organizations have changed names, add the new name to the “orgname” field according to the naming convention (s. below.) preserving the old name.

4. Variables

Organization-specific variables:

Country (string): Name of the country. From Gleditsch and Ward (1999).

Country ID (numeric): From Gleditsch and Ward (1999).

Organization ID (numeric): Automatically generated by the coding tool.

⁸ If the “Org2019”-project was used, the integration process would overwrite all existing, previously collected data from the “Org2EPR 2019”-project.

Organization (string): Complete name of the organization adhering to the following format keeping accents and special characters whenever possible: *Long Name Original Language (Abbreviation)*, if applicable: *New Long Name Original Language (Abbreviation) / Long Name in Other Country Language (Abbreviation) / English Name (if applicable: English Abbreviation)*. Taken from either of the following sources:

- A) Political parties: Parline Database, Adam Carr’s Election Archive, European Election Database, African Elections Database, Nohlen’s election handbooks, National Election Commissions.
- B) Self-determination movements: lists from Kathleen Cunningham.
- C) Other non-state actors: World Directory of Minority Groups International, Political Handbooks

Sources (string): Specifies the source where the organization was listed.

EPR group(s) (string): Name(s) of ethnic group(s) that the organization represents, as listed in the EPR dataset. Coding tool provides coders with a list of the EPR groups in each country.

EPR group ID(s) (numeric): Ethnic group ID(s) used in EPR.

Variables specific to organization-group link:

Note that the following variables have to be coded for each organization-group link separately.

Note also that the “base” variables are coded as “true” if they have applied at *any* time of the organization’s lifetime. Time-variation is coded in the corresponding columns next to the base variables.

Ethnic link variables: In what ways is the organization linked to each of the ethnic groups specified above? Note that more than one variable may be true for each organization-group link.

Ethnic claim (dummy variable): Does the organization make explicit ethno-political claims for the group (see definition in section 2.2)? Yes (1) or no (0).

Ethnic recruitment (dummy variable): Do members overwhelmingly join, or are admitted to, the organization based on their ethnic identity? Yes (1) or no (0).

Ethnic electoral support (dummy variable): If the organization participates in *national* electoral politics, do the party's voters overwhelmingly make their vote choice based on their ethnic identity? Yes (1) or no (0).

Founding year (numeric): Year in which the organization was founded.⁹ In cases, in which an organization emerged from another, already existing organization (for instance, a political party emerging from a social movement organization), we code the founding year of the newly emerging organization *if* it can be considered a *separate* political organization, according to the operational criteria outlined in section 2.3 above.¹⁰ If, in contrast, the newly emerging organization merely constitutes a new institutional form of, or a subsidiary part of, the same organization (with the same leadership), we code the founding year of the existing organization.

Dissolution year (numeric, if applicable): Year in which the organization ceased to exist. Leave blank if organization still exists.

Organization's agenda/goals variables: What goals has the organization pursued, or what has been its political agenda, with respect to a given ethnic group? Coding of these variables may be based either on explicit organization claims or on more implicitly signaled aims. Note that more than one variable may be true for each organization-group link.

Governmental power (dummy variable): Has the organization attempted to increase the ethnic group's power or influence in the national-level government? Note that this does not entail that the respective organization was in power, but that it advocated for more political power. Such demands could include parliamentary seats for members of the ethnic group or an ethnic quota in administrative bodies. Calling for the president to be from a specific ethnic group could be another example. Yes (1) or no (0).

⁹ Note that the time restriction of 1946 to 2019 does *not* apply to the founding year variable. Thus, coders should indicate the actual founding year of an organization even if it goes back to before 1946.

¹⁰ Note that the same rule applies to organizations that were dissolved at one point and founded again later under the same name.

Regional autonomy (dummy variable): Has the organization advocated regional autonomy for the ethnic group? Regional autonomy here refers to demands that aim to grant the respective ethnic group in its territory a special political arrangement where the region gains authority with respect to the national government. Such arrangements can include increased legislative rights for the group's region, authority over education, or the creation of local executive powers. In comparison to separatism, however, the region remains part of its national state. Yes (1) or no (0).

Separatism (dummy variable): Has the organization promoted the ethnic group's secession from the home country and/or the unification with an ethnic/national group living in another state? Yes (1) or no (0).

Economic redistribution (dummy variable): Has the organization aimed for a greater share of economic resources for the ethnic group that are distributed by or stem from the national government? Economic redistribution refers to a direct or indirect transfer of socio-economic assets. Examples include subsidies, welfare state transfers, and fiscal revenues. Yes (1) or no (0).

Religious rights (dummy variable): Has the organization aimed at increasing the religious rights of the ethnic group? For example: Group members' religion should be officially recognized by the state. Note that ethnic organizations should not automatically be coded as advancing religious rights because they are linked to ethnic groups based on a common religion (e.g. Hindus in India). As usual, concrete evidence is required. Yes (1) or no (0).

Linguistic rights (dummy variable): Has the organization aimed at increasing the linguistic rights of the ethnic group? For example, by demanding to lift prohibitions on minority languages or the right of group members to receive official schooling in their own language. Yes (1) or no (0).

Non-ethnic goals (dummy variable): Has the organization also pursued non-ethnic goals, as, for example, ideological goals? An example would be an ethnic organization that has also advocated the creation of a Marxist society in the ethnic group's country or homeland. Yes (1) or no (0).

Other goals (string): Coders may freely list other political goals not covered by the aforementioned dummy variables. Several other goals should be separated by a comma.

Means of group representation/mobilization strategies: What means has the organization used to advance the interests of the ethnic group? Note that more than one variable may apply for each organization-group link.

Electoral participation (dummy variable): Has the organization participated in national (parliamentary or presidential) elections? Yes (1) or no (0).

Non-electoral, non-violent strategies (dummy variable): Has the organization used non-electoral, but non-violent means of ethnic group representation, such as lobbying, filing petitions, demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, etc.? For ethnic parties, such events should not be limited to electoral campaign activities. Yes (1) or no (0).

Violence against government (dummy variable): Has the organization intentionally used violence against the state or state agents during its history? Violence is defined here as actions intentionally leading to the loss of life or consciously accepting the possibility of the loss of life. Note that this variable should only be coded as true if intention can be assumed, i.e. if the organization intentionally promoted violent strategies. Yes (1) or no (0).

Violence against civilians (dummy variable): Has the organization intentionally employed violence against civilians during its history? Civilians are defined here as individuals that are not representing the state or other armed factions. Note that this variable should only be coded as true if intention can be assumed, i.e. if the organization intentionally promoted actions to harm civilians. If civilians have been harmed as an unintended side effect of violence against the government, it is *not* counted as violence against civilians. Yes (1) or no (0).

Other mobilization strategies (string): Coders may freely list other mobilization strategies not covered by the aforementioned dummy variables. Several other mobilization strategies should be separated by a comma.

Sources (string): The coders are asked to provide all sources they relied on in their coding in a *scientific format*, including (if possible) precise page numbers. If web resources are used, URL's are included.

Comments (string): The coders are asked to include additional information in this field. It can be used, for example, to provide more detailed explanations of ambiguous coding decisions, briefly explaining confidence scores (s. below), and providing short narratives regarding organizations. In order to differentiate comments from previous versions coders should start their text with "EPR-O 2.0".

Confidence (ordinal): The coders are asked to assess their confidence in their coding of a given organization-group link, using a predefined set of ordinal categories ranging from "certain" (1) to "not at all confident" (5).

5. Time Variation


In parallel to coding the substantive variables coders are asked to collect information on temporal variation for the following variables:

- Ethnic group ID
- Regional autonomy
- Separatism
- Religious rights
- Linguistic rights
- Electoral participation
- Violence against government
- Violence against civilians

Note that as in the case of the (time-invariant) variable coding, **time period changes are coded for each organization-group link separately.**

The coding is carried out in the "Org2EPR 2019" project of the online Coding Front End (CFE).

Figure 4: The temporal framework



5.1. General Guidelines for Coding Time Variation

This section discusses the general rules guiding the coding of temporal variation in the characteristics of ethno-political organizations.

1) **Our time-variance approach features a nested structure, consisting of two levels:** the ethnic group level and the variables level, with the latter nested in the former. The ethnic group level refers to the “ethnic group ID” variable and specifies the time period during which a given organization-group link is valid, i.e. an organization is linked to a particular ethnic group. This “macro” time period defines the limits within which the other variables may be true. Put differently, an organization’s identified goals and strategies may apply to the entire macro time period or to sub-periods *within* (but not outside) this overall period. Such sub-periods are indicated by time period changes at the variables level. Note that *time period breaks for different variables do not have to match each other*, i.e. they may coincide or overlap with, or completely differ from, each other.


II) **The macro time period** is given by the period specified in the “ethnic group ID” variable. If no period is specified in that variable, the macro time period is defined as the organization’s “lifetime”, i.e. the time from its founding year to 2019 (or the dissolution year).

Figure 4 illustrates this nested temporal framework, using a hypothetical example. While Organization X existed from 1962 to 2019, the relevant macro time period in this case starts in 1965 when the organization began to represent ethnic group A. Hence, 1965-2013 is the period for which the organization-group link is valid, and this constitutes the maximum time period during which the organization’s goals and strategies can be assumed to be true. In the current example, all variables, except for “separatism” and “religious rights,” are indeed considered to have remained constant between 1965 and 2013. Yet, the organization did experience changes over time with respect to its secessionist demands. These demands began to be raised in 1981 and were dropped again in 2009. Thus, a separate sub-period is introduced for the “separatism” variable, *within* the macro time period, lasting from 1981 to 2009. For their part, explicit claims for religious rights of ethnic group A were only formulated from 2006 on. This requires the coding of an additional sub-period for the “religious rights” variable covering the years from 2006 to 2013 (the “official” limit of the time horizon of the EPR-Organizations project).

III) **Temporal changes in the “ethnic group ID” variable:** In principle, we assume the ethnic link(s) coded for a given organization to be true for the organization’s entire lifetime – i.e. from its foundation to 2019 (or the dissolution year). This standard coding is “overruled” through time period changes in the “ethnic group ID” variable in either of *three scenarios*:

- An organization emerged as a non-ethnic political entity and became “ethnicized” (i.e. started to represent (a) particular ethnic group(s)) at a later point of its life. This is the scenario represented in Figure 4.
- An organization was formed as an ethnically based organization, but became “de-ethnicized” (i.e. aborted/lost its ethno-political base/agenda) at some point of time.

Figure 5: Temporal changes in an organization’s goals or strategies. Coding procedure



- An organization represented distinct ethnic groups in different periods of time. This may be the case, for example, if an organization’s political base/agenda is closely tied to its leader. If the ethnic identity of the leader changes, so might the organization’s ethnic identity.

In each of these three scenarios, clear evidence is required to justify the coding of a temporal change in the ethnic identity of an organization.

IV) **Temporal changes in an organization’s goals or strategies:** Again, we start from the assumption that an organization’s goals and strategies are constant over time (i.e. applying to the entire macro period). This means that sub-periods for the above-listed variables should only be introduced if there is clear evidence for what could be called turning points” in the goal(s) or the strategy(-ies) of an organization (i.e. organizations either taking up or abandoning certain goals or strategies).

More concretely, by default the start year of the macro period is assumed to be the start year of a particular goal/strategy. If (and only if) concrete evidence suggests that this goal/strategy became relevant at a later point of time, a new time period onset [*from X*] is introduced (“Distinct start” in Figure 5). The same applies to time period endings. By default, the end year of the macro period is assumed to apply (even after the introduction of a distinct start year!). If (and only if) concrete evidence suggests that a particular goal/strategy ceased to be relevant at some point of time, a new time period ending [*to X*]

is introduced (“Distinct end” in Figure 5). (See also the technical explanations in the following section!) Since a particular goal or strategy may become relevant or irrelevant at various points of time, the coding procedure can be conceptualized as a “decision cycle” as illustrated in Figure 5.

In the hypothetical scenario of Figure 4 above, for instance, the consulted sources might have explicitly mentioned a radicalization of Organization X beginning in 1981, with leaders of the organization raising demands for secession (rather than for regional autonomy) on behalf of ethnic group A in that year. The same sources might also have explicitly stated that the organization’s demands subsequently receded again to calls for regional autonomy, following a new manifesto issued by the organization in the year of 2009. Hence, based on such explicit evidence, both a distinct start and end year can be identified, leading to the time period of 1981-2009.

In some cases, it might be clear that a change in a particular goal or strategy of an organization occurred over time, but no clear turning point can be identified. In these cases, coders should indicate approximate estimated years for the time period break(s), based on an evaluation of all available information.

V) **Precision of the time period coding:** Priority is given to the year. Months and days should only be specified if the identified turning points in a particular goal or strategy of an organization coincide with a *specific, well-known date*. This might be the case, for example, when an organization issues a public secessionist demand or religious claim, etc., for the first time on a well-known date. Similarly, if a precise turning point in the organization’s approach to the use of violence can be identified – i.e. if there is a specific event/incident that marks the organization’s switch from non-violent to violent strategies (or vice versa) – the exact date should be recorded. For instance, if a previously militant organization signs a truce or peace agreement with a state government and henceforth abstains from the use of violence, the exact date of the agreement should be used to indicate the period break.

These explanations also apply to the temporal changes in the organization’s ethnic identity (“ethnic group ID” variable). For instance, if there is clear evidence that a formerly non-ethnic political organization became “ethnicized” on a well-known date – e.g., when it first made a public statement in favor of (a) specific ethnic group(s) – the date of that statement should be considered the relevant temporal marker.

In contrast, if there is clear evidence for a change in a particular goal or strategy of an organization, but this change occurred in a more gradual manner (i.e. without a specific, well-known incident), coders should only indicate the (estimated) year of the shift.

VI) **Beginning and ending of violence:** Organizations' use of violence against the government or civilians often occurs intermittently, i.e. in a non-constant way. (This is especially true for the organizations included in the EPR-Organizations dataset, which does not focus on rebel organizations involved in civil wars.) We distinguish between two general scenarios. On the one hand, if violence is the main reason for an organization's existence, i.e. if an organization is *formed as a means to perform acts of violence* (for instance, in the case of a militant or terrorist organization), the corresponding violence variable(s) should be coded as true for the entire macro period.

On the other hand, if an organization at times engaged in acts of violence, but violence is not its main *raison d'être*, sub-periods should be defined during which the corresponding violence variable(s) are assumed to be true. In the best case, coders will be able to specify all years in which the organization carried out acts of violence. When this is not feasible, the main objective is to identify the year (or date) of the organization's first act of violence against the government and/or civilians, as well as the year (or date) of the last such act (if applicable). In this case, violence is coded as "True" for the entire period between the first and last incidence. See also the technical notes in the next section on how to go about the concrete coding!

VII) **Time variation in the electoral participation variable:** In this case, sub-periods are defined as the periods pertaining to one or more consecutive electoral cycles. *The start year is given by the year, in which the (first) election took place; the end year as the last year of the corresponding legislature/presidential term (whatever occurs later).*¹¹ Hence, such a sub-period may be limited to a single electoral cycle of, say, four years or, for instance, include four cycles of five years each, totaling twenty years. In the case of interruptions in an organization's electoral participation (caused either by the organization itself or context factors), various sub-periods need to be introduced in the same way. If electoral participation starts in the same year as the macro time period and lasts uninterruptedly until its end, no sub-period should be specified. The inclusion criteria above apply.

¹¹ In the case of *coup d'états* or other irregular endings of a legislative period, the year of the dissolution of the legislative body constitutes the end year.

VIII) **All decisions regarding the time-variant codings of variables should be explained in the general “Comments” field** at the bottom of the “Org2EPR 2019 ” interface, along with references to the sources used. The general rule: “as detailed as necessary, as concise as possible!” applies.

5.2. Technical Setup

Time periods should be indicated in the corresponding “Time periods” fields (immediately after the pertinent variable) in the following way:

- *1980*: True during the single year of 1980 (1.1.1980-31.12.1980)
- *1980-*: True from (the beginning of) 1980 onward
- *-1980*: True until (the end of) year 1980
- *1980-1990*: True from (the beginning of) 1980 until (the end of) 1990

Precise dates can be specified by entering the day and/or month:

- *11.1980-*: True from (the beginning of) November 1980 onward
- *23.11.1980-*: True from November 23, 1980 onward

Multiple time periods should be entered by separating each entry with a comma:

- *1980,1985-10.1990,2001-*: True during the year of 1980, then from 1985 until the end of October 1990, and then again from the year 2001 onward

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